Category: Investing

  • Encouraging Institutional Investors to Buy 10% of the Angel Investor Equity

    In last month’s post Why Not More Startup Success Stories, reader Jeff offered an interesting idea where institutional investors would be encouraged to buy 10% of the equity from the angel investors, assuming they’d be interested in selling. For most startup communities, there are very few exits resulting in long/indefinite delays before angel investors receive a return on their money and thus the rate at which returns are recycled back into the community is limited. If institutional investors more routinely bought a small stake from the angel investors — say 10% — that’d generate angel returns faster and allow institutional investors to buy a larger piece of the startup.

    Here’s how it might look:

    • Angel investor buy 10% of the startup for $150,000 resulting in a $1.5 million post-money valuation
    • Startup achieves strong traction and raises a $3 million Series A at a $7 million pre-money ($10 million post-money)
    • Institutional investor that’s buying ~30% of the company (less the pro-rata from any existing investors that want to invest more) is willing to increase their investment up to $3.14 million such that the existing investor that owns 10% before the financing round can sell up to 20% of their stake which represents up to 2% of the company (10% ownership of the $7 million pre-money represents $70,000 for one percent) for $140,000 thus nearly recouping their initial investment while still having 8% of the company remaining (pre Series A investment)
    • Post Series A investment, and after selling 20%, the angel investor now has 5.6% of the company (8% diluted by 30%, not counting a potential increase in option pool)

    The institutional investor would want the angel’s equity reclassified as the same type of equity as the Series A otherwise there might be a discount.

    By encouraging institutional investors to buy a small piece of the existing equity held by the angel investors, angels are more likely to invest in other startups and capital will be recycled faster in the community. Entrepreneurs should consider asking institutional investors about this when raising capital.

    What else? What are some more thoughts on the idea of encouraging institutional investors to buy a small amount of equity from existing angel investors?

  • Due Diligence for an Angel Investment

    When raising money from angel investors, they often require a fair amount of due diligence to ensure the startup is what the entrepreneurs say it is and that it has proper record keeping. If the startup raises money from Institutional investors, like venture capitalists, the amount of due diligence increases substantially. Here are a few commonly requested items as part of due diligence from angel investors:

    • Operating agreement
    • Founder legal agreements like non-compete, non-solicitation, etc.
    • Cap table with any equity grants, stock sales, etc.
    • Customer contracts
    • Employee IP assignments
    • Financial forecasts
    • Financial statements
    • Recent bank statements

    Entrepreneurs would do well to keep their legal and financial affairs in order generally, but especially so when close to the term sheet phase of the fundraising process.

    What else? What are some more thoughts on due diligence when raising money from angel investors?

  • Raising Money as Forcing Function to Drive Towards an Exit

    Recently I was talking to an entrepreneur that was working on raising money for his startup. After asking the normal questions including “why do you want to raise money”, he volunteered something I don’t hear too often: I want to raise money to bring on a partner that will position the business for an exit in a few years. The idea is that raising money will act as a forcing function to drive towards an exit.

    Here are a few questions to think through:

    • Why not sell now? What additional value will be gained raising money?
    • What specifically is desired in a capital partner?
    • What’s the ideal timeline? What milestones need to be hit?
    • Are there any market dynamics at work that might improve or decline over the next few years?
    • How many more rounds of capital, and dilution, will be required to achieve the desired exit?

    Planning for an exit in a timeframe is never really doable unless the business is profitable with enough scale to know that there’s an exit based on an EBITDA multiple to a private equity firm or other financial buyer. Most startups want a buyer that pays up based on growth potential, and those are nearly impossible to plan for confidently. Raising money does create more pressure to eventually find an exit, but isn’t a guarantee.

    What else? What are some more thoughts on raising money as a forcing function to drive towards an exit?

  • Anatomy of a Successful Venture Deal – PetSmart’s Acquisition of Chewy.com for $3.35 Billion

    Recode published an article earlier today that PetSmart is acquiring Chewy.com for $3.35 billion in the largest e-commerce acquisition ever. This is a case where raising venture capital helped a startup grow significantly faster, resulting in a much larger and more valuable business when compared to growing organically. According to CrunchBase, Chewy.com started in the summer of 2011 and is less than six years old. Last year, Chewy.com did almost $900 million in revenue (source) and presumably will do over $1 billion in revenue this year.

    For a venture perspective, this is a homerun. Let’s look at how the economics might play out:

    • Volition Capital invests $15 million in the Series A in 2013 (source) and buys ~25% (a guess) of the company (typical venture rounds are for 20 – 35% of the company)
    • Chewy.com goes on to raise a total of $236 million in equity over multiple rounds (source) resulting in dilution to the Series A investors (depends heavily on pro-rata participation)
    • Assuming the original Series A investment was diluted down to ~10% (a guess), that $15 million investment would be worth $335 million now (depends on earn-outs and other behind-the-scenes factors)
    • Turning $15 million into $335 million is a 22.3x return and likely returned more than the entire Volition fund

    Congratulations to Larry at Volition Capital and the whole team at Chewy.com on the acquisition.

    What else? What are some more elements of this successful venture deal?

  • Investor Reference Call Questions for Existing Investors

    Several months ago I was talking to an entrepreneur/angel investor that was interested in investing in a startup where I’m an investor. As part of his due diligence on the potential investment, he wanted to talk to existing investors and get their thoughts on the startup. Naturally, I obliged.

    Here are some of the reference call questions from a potential investor to an existing investor:

    • What’s your experience been like working with the startup? What’s gone well and what hasn’t gone well?
    • What’s your experience been like working with the CEO? What’s gone well and what hasn’t gone well?
    • What’s your outlook on the business? How has that changed from your original investment?
    • What are the dynamics of the board like? How productive are the board meetings?
    • Are you participating in this next round? Why or why not?
    • What questions should I be asking as a potential investor?

    New investors want to hear that existing investors are bullish on the startup and have had a good experience. Of course, existing investors often want the money from new investors to help the company, so there’s an element where potential investors have to make a judgement call as to the quality and truthfulness of the existing investor responses.

    Entrepreneurs would do well to keep their existing investors informed and engaged for a number of reasons, one of which is that potential investors in the future will expect to do reference calls with them.

    What else? What are some more questions for potential investors to ask existing investors?

  • Evaluating an Angel Investment

    With startups in vogue for many years now, more people are becoming first-time angel investors (“tourists” is the parlance for angel investors that come and go). A number of would-be angels have asked for advice when evaluating an angel investment.

    Here are a few thoughts:

    • Team – At this stage, it’s 70% the team. Are they resilient? Will they grind it out? How resourceful are they? Most entrepreneurs don’t have the necessary grit.
    • Idea / Market – At this stage, it’s 30% the idea / market. Is it a small, fast growing market? Is it resegmenting an existing, large market? Great ideas in great markets are key.
    • Timing – The ideal timing is 2-3 years before mainstream adoption. Being too early is a failure. Being too late is a failure.
    • Pro Rata – Investors are commonly granted the right to participate in future financing rounds based on their percentage ownership. Angel investors should plan on reserving $2 for every $1 invested (e.g. invest $100,000 initially and then have another $200,000 ready for future rounds to participate pro rata).
    • Next Round Likelihood – Raising an angel round is one small milestone in a long journey. What are the chances the startup can raise money in 12-18 months at 3x the current valuation? Most startups require multiple rounds of financing.

    Evaluating an angel investment is very subjective. With limited metrics and operating history it’s a bet on the team and market. Remember that angel investing should be viewed as charity and most angel investors never make money even after doing a number of deals.

    What else? What are some more thoughts on evaluating an angel investment?

  • Valuing a Pre-Revenue Startup

    Last week an entrepreneur reached out for help on an estimated valuation for his pre-revenue startup. After building a prototype and getting some non-paying early testers, he’s looking to raise an angel round and wanted thoughts on what’s normal in the market. I asked a number of questions and offered up a few ideas:

    • Base Valuation – Pre-money valuations are usually $1-$2 million for a startup with a prototype and a handful of users. Typical funding rounds are for $300-$500k whereby the entrepreneur sells around 20-25% of the business.
    • Management Team Premium – If it’s an experienced management team or highly-regarded prior employer, there’s a large increase in pre-money valuation to $3-$4 million. Investors view an experienced management team as more likely to be successful and pay up for it.
    • Half the Next Round Valuation – Figure out the milestones for this round (e.g. revenue targets), and estimate the corresponding valuation for the next round with those milestones. Then, with the expected next round valuation, divide it in half to value this round. Investors want to believe that they can double their money on paper in 18 months, and see a clear path to get there.

    Pre-revenue valuations are always subjective and come down to how eager either side wants to get a deal done. There’s no exact number but these are good guidelines for normal deals.

    What else? What are some other ideas for valuing a pre-revenue startup?

  • Notes from the Okta S-1 IPO Filing

    Okta, a SaaS identity management platform (software to manage which corporate applications people can use), just released their S-1 IPO filing to go public. You might wonder how big the market is to manage authentication and authorization in the cloud, and as we’ll see, it’s quite large.

    Here are a few notes for the Okta S-1 IPO filing:

    • Founded in 2009 (pg. 1 – Note: founding to IPO in eight years is fast!)
    • 2 million people use Okta daily (pg. 1)
    • 2,900 customers (pg. 2)
    • Revenues (pg. 2)
      • 2015 – $41 million
      • 2016 – $86 million
      • Last nine months – $112 million
    • Losses (pg. 2)
      • 2015 – $59 million
      • 2016 – $76 million
      • Last nine months – $65.3 million
    • Estimated $18 billion global opportunity (pg. 3)
    • Over 5,000 integrations available (pg. 4 – Note: strong network effect)
    • Product modules (pg. 4)
      • Universal directory
      • Single sign-on
      • Multi-factor authentication
      • Lifecycle management
      • Mobility management
      • API access management
    • Original company name: Saasure (pg. 6)
    • 12% internation revenue (pg. 34)
    • Accumulated deficit of $270 million (pg. 51)
    • 11% of revenue from professional services (pg. 57)
    • Weighted-average contract duration of 2.4 years (pg. 62)
    • Define contribution margin as the annual contract value of subscription commitments, or ACV, from the customer cohort at the end of a period less the associated cost of subscription revenue and sales and marketing expenses (pg. 63 – Note: this is the SaaS Magic Number)
    • 443 customers with an annual contract value over $100,000 (pg. 65)
    • Deferred revenue of $100 million (pg. 78 – Note: this means customers pay their annual subscription upfront making for a significant amount of “free” working capital)
    • “Okta” is the unit of measure for cloud cover in meteorology (pg. 88)
    • Ownership (pg. 132)
      • Co-founder/CEO – 10.3%
      • Co-founder/COO – 6.2%
      • VCs – 65.7%

    Okta is like a utility providing a core service that everyone needs but doesn’t get much attention. Identity management in the cloud is critical infrastructure with a massive market and Okta, as the leader, will have a successful IPO.

    Congratulations to Todd and the team!

    What else? What are some more thoughts on Okta’s S-1 IPO filing?

  • 4 Reasons Investors Shouldn’t Do Convertible Notes

    Over the last week the topic of convertible notes came up in two different conversations. Convertible notes are essentially a loan to a startup that converts to equity on a certain date or if the startup raises a certain amount of capital. Convertible notes (and subsequently the safe) became popular several years ago as investors wanted to move fast, keep initial legal costs down, and defer the valuation topic to the next investor. Basically, a much simpler transaction. Only, it put convertible note holders in a poor position.

    Here are four reasons investors shouldn’t do convertible notes:

    1. Misalignment on Valuation – Convertible notes often have a cap which represents a maximum valuation for the investor (e.g. a cap of $3 million such that if the startup raises money at a $4 million valuation, the investors’ debt converts at the lower of the two valuations). Only, the convertible note investor is incentivized for the startup to raise money at a lower valuation so that they’ll get more equity for their money (assuming everything else about the terms is equal). Entrepreneurs want to raise money on good terms and good valuations, but that isn’t aligned with the convertible note holders as they have negative benefit with a higher valuation.
    2. Limited Initial Upside – Most convertible notes have a discount of 20% to the next round of financing (e.g. if the round is at a $5 million valuation, the convertible note holders get their equity at a $4 million valuation as that’s 20% less). Yet, raising convertible debt doesn’t guarantee a subsequent round of financing happens quickly. If the financing round takes 6-12 months (or more), the investor is only getting a paper return of 20% for taking on outsized risk. Investors typically want to see their portfolio companies raise money each round at a minimum of twice the last valuation.
    3. Lack of Future Qualified Financing Event – Most convertible notes only convert at a qualified financing event (some have a conversion date far in the future). If the startup doesn’t raise more money, or can’t raise more money, the investor is essentially stuck with a low interest loan in a high risk investment.
    4. No Governance – Convertible notes are simple debt with limited covenants and no governance rights. Ideally, the startup will raise a “normal” round and have the governance that comes from a board and a lead investor in the future, but there’s no definitive timeline. Without governance, the entrepreneurs can do what they please with the money with limited recourse.

    Investors would do well to understand the pros and cons of convertible debt. Personally, I require equity and don’t invest via convertible debt.

    What else? What are some more reasons why convertible debt can be worse off for investors?

  • 4 Quick Ways to Evaluate a Startup Idea as an Investor

    Earlier this week an entrepreneur casually threw out an idea he had on the side that wasn’t related to his startup. My recommendation: don’t judge an entrepreneur’s idea. Push them to do customer discovery and let the market plus their internal motivation decide if the idea makes sense or not.

    Now, as an investor, once you get past the common requirements of a great team and market, there are four quick ways I like to evaluate an idea:

    1. Must-Have vs Nice-to-Have – If the app is taken away from customers tomorrow, how much do they complain? How replaceable is the app if they just went back to email and spreadsheets?
    2. In the Path of Revenue – Where the app in the path of revenue? How clear is it that the app helps the company make more money?
    3. System of Record vs Utility – What functional category does the app fall in? Do people live in the app most of the day? Once a week? Set it and forget it?
    4. Timing – Where’s the market in the adoption lifecycle? Is it too early? Too late? Timing is 10x more important than people realize.

    Evaluating an idea is hard. These four quick ways help me develop a mental model of a startup idea to see if I should pursue it further.

    What else? What are some other quick ways to evaluate a startup ideas as an investor?