Category: Strategy

  • 500 Startups Checklist for Investing in a Startup

    Last night I had the opportunity to listen to Paul Singh present the 500 Startups thesis at the ATDC. He did a great job outlining how things have changed in the tech startup world over the past 10 years as well as making a great a argument for investing in a large number of startups with a structured thesis.

    One of my favorite slides was the 500 startups checklist for investing:

    • Product solves a problem for a specific target customer
    • Capital-efficient businesses – operational @ <$1M funding
    • Primarily internet-based distribution – search, social, mobile, location
    • Simple revenue models – transactions, subscriptions, or affiliate
    • Functional prototype before investment (or previous success)
    • Small but measurable usage – some customers, early revenue
    • Small but cross-functional team – engineer, design/UX, marketing

    I think this is a great list. One item I’d add: co-founders are working full-time on the business and don’t have day jobs (if they need to wait tables at night to pay the bills, that’s fine). Also, design/UX is critical for B2C startups but Twitter Bootstrap makes it less critical for B2B startups.

    What else? What are your thoughts on the 500 Startups checklist for investing in a startup?

  • Y Combinator and TechStars are Very Different

    Lately I’ve been reading The Launch Pad: Inside Y Combinator, Silicon Valley’s Most Exclusive School for Startups by Randall Stross. A future post will be a book review but I want to touch on a topic within the book first: Y Combinator and TechStars are very different. In fact, I know several people that have gone through each program, and their feedback and insight into the respective programs corroborates the differences.

    Here’s information on each program:

    Y Combinator

    • 60+ startups per class
    • Single city location (Mountain View)
    • No shared office space
    • No third-party mentors
    • ~$18k investment for ~6% of common stock
    • $150k convertible debt with no cap
    • Strong independent team orientation

    TechStars

    • 10 – 15 startups per class
    • Multiple cities (Boulder, NYC, Boston, and Seattle along with affiliates)
    • Shared office space
    • Third-party mentors
    • ~$20k investment for ~6% of common stock
    • $100k convertible debt with $3MM cap
    • Strong fraternity/group orientation

    Now, it isn’t that one is better than the other, only that they are very different. Y Combinator is more like grad students doing independent research projects and TechStars is more like a fraternity with everyone working on different projects in the house.

    What else? What are some other ways that Y Combinator and TechStars are very different?

  • Accelerated Second City Office Expansion Due to the Talent War

    With the ongoing war for talent in startups, especially in the money centers of California and New York, there’s going to be an increased focused on expanding to another city, with a separate talent pool, earlier in the startup lifecycle, when compared to historical standards. Traditionally, it wasn’t until a startup reached a critical mass in their scale that they would look for a second full office, not simply a light-weight sales office (e.g. Google has a massive engineering office in New York City). As for Atlanta, I know of at least two fast-growing software startups based in Florida, one based in South Carolina, one based in NYC, and two based in San Francisco (Square has an office in Atlantic Station in Midtown, Atlanta) that have full engineering offices in Atlanta. This trend is only going to accelerate.

    Here are a few reasons why startups with expand to a second city faster than historically:

    • Talent pools in a geographic area are only so large, creating excessively high demand for talent in the money centers like San Francisco and Silicon Valley
    • Money centers also have exceptionally high costs of living and housing prices, making it more desirable to have a significant office presence in a second city where costs are lower (Trulia is based in San Francisco but has hundreds of employees in Denver)
    • Video conferencing (e.g. Google Hangout) and cloud-based collaboration apps are better than ever, making it easy to work in separate physical locations
    • Acqui-hires are more common now, making it more likely startups will look for acui-hires in other cities to be the basis for a new office location

    Second city office expansion is already taking place faster for startups, but entrepreneurs aren’t talking about it as frequently as they should. Look for it to be even more commonplace over the coming years.

    What else? Do you think there will be accelerated second city office expansion due to the talent war?

  • The Rise of Enterprise Software Purchased Bottom-up

    Chris Dixon, one of the best startup bloggers out there, has a new post up today titled The Rise of Enterprise Marketing. In the post, Chris argues that a serious trend with enterprise (business) Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) is that of front-line managers and employees buying software in a bottom-up manner as opposed to the historical top-down manner. Some successful SaaS companies, including Yammer, which just sold to Microsoft for $1.2 billion, use a freemium model where the sales people only call on people already using the free edition — no more cold calls.

    Another key point is that instead of sales people leading the charge to the CIO or department heads, marketing is leading the charge reaching out to the end users. With the end users on board, they either buy directly in a low friction fashion (e.g. a credit card) or if enough people get involved they make a traditional enterprise type sale. The sales cycle and cost of customer acquisition is a magnitude lower in this model compared to the traditional model.

    As for the title of the post, “The Rise of Enterprise Marketing” isn’t the clearest headline to describe the content. Enterprise marketing has been around since the beginning of business software. This is really enterprise marketing targeted at the end user so that the corporate software can be purchased in a bottom-up manner. Regardless, this is a major trend deserving of serious attention.

    What else? What are your thoughts on the rise of enterprise software purchased bottom-up?

  • A Startup is a Scalable Growth-Focused Company

    Paul Graham’s most recent essay this week, titled Startup = Growth, argues that startups are companies designed to grow with a scalable business model. The idea is that a startup is different from most businesses, like a barber shop, in that they are high growth-oriented from the beginning. So, a startup can be in the early low/no growth phase as well as the rapid growth phase that eventually levels off, resulting in a regular, large business, if the startup is successful.

    Another prominent startup author, Steve Blank, argues that a startup is an organization formed to search for a repeatable and scalable business model. The idea is that once the new entity figures out product/market fit and starts building a business, the organization is now a company and no longer a startup. Now, these are fundamentally different: one says that startups are high growth-oriented companies from the beginning through rapid growth stage and the other says that startups are temporary businesses at the earliest stage.

    My personal belief is that startups are of the Paul Graham definition (and a superset of the Steve Blank definition). Here’s how I view a startup:

    • Large, scalable business potential that isn’t predicated on any one person (most businesses are replicative of an existing model instead of innovative with a new model)
    • Significant amounts of change and uncertainty on a weekly or monthly basis (companies like a healthcare provider have change and uncertainty, but it doesn’t manifest itself in such a short time frame)
    • Top line annual revenue growth of 30% or more once a modest level of product/market fit has been achieved

    To me, startups are about scale and growth with the later being the most important, as Paul Graham clearly articulates.

    What else? What are your thoughts on a startup being a scalable growth-focused company?

  • Salesforce.com’s Stock is Priced for Perfection

    At Salesforce.com’s Dreamforce conference this past week there were a number of hot topics like cloud computing, social media marketing management (a.k.a. the marketing cloud), and big data. One item I heard discussed on the show floor was Salesforce.com’s meteoric stock price and market cap. When I asked further about the stock price to one attendee, he described it as “being priced for perfection.” Having not heard that phrase before, I asked what it meant. Simply put, it means that the price is so high that there’s no room for error and Salesforce.com must keep exceeding analyst’s expectations. If Salesforce.com misses analyst’s growth, revenue, and earnings expectations in a quarter, expect a large correction in stock price.

    Here are some of the numbers for Salesforce.com now, as of September 22, 2012, from Google Finance for NYSE:CRM:

    • Market cap: $21.57 billion
    • Stock price: 155.20
    • Cash on hand: $1 billion
    • Total current assets: $1.85 billion
    • Total debt: $508 million
    • Last quarter’s revenue: $731 million
    • Run rate based on last quarter’s revenue: $2.92 billion
    • Enterprise value: ~$21.07 billion
    • Revenue run rate multiple: ~7x

    A revenue run rate top line multiple of 7x is incredible for any company, but especially so with a company that has 8,765 employees. Salesforce.com’s stock is priced for perfection and I hope they continue to exceed expectations.

    What else? What are your thoughts on Salesforce.com and their stock being priced for perfection?

  • Odds of Raising Venture Money and Selling for $100M+

    Bob Dorf, co-author of Startup Owner’s Manual, has a post on Steve Blank’s blog titled Why Too Many Startups (er) Suck where he cites a stat that between .2% and 2% of all venture-backed startups ever sell for more than $100 million. Think about that for a minute: with 1,000 venture-backed startups, somewhere in the 2-20 range reach a nine-figure exit.

    Let’s take the math further. Suppose, for simple analysis purposes, that only venture-backed companies sell for at least $100M+ (not true but it’s even more rare for a bootstrapped company to sell for $100M+ compared to a venture-backed company).What percentage of companies actually raise venture capital? According to a piece on Quora, .6% of companies raise venture capital.

    Taking all companies that are created, all companies that raise at least one round of venture capital, and all companies that sell for $100M+, you get between .0012 and .00012. That is, one in 10,000 – 100,000 companies will raise venture capital and sell for $100M+.

    The next time someone offers raising venture capital as a way to get a slice of a watermelon instead of owning a grape, ask them how many watermelons are grown each year.

    What else? What are your thoughts on the odds of raising venture money and selling for $100M+?

  • Free Doesn’t Help if the Market Isn’t Ready

    Recently I was talking to an entrepreneur who’s working on a new open source product for a small but fast growing market. After talking about it with him for 10 minutes, and learning more about the opportunity, I told him that I thought he was much too early. Free doesn’t help if the market isn’t ready.

    For our company Pardot, we could give away our software for free and we wouldn’t materially increase the number of active, successful clients. The challenge with our market, and the market this entrepreneur is going after, is that there’s a) a significant lack of market awareness and b) a significant lack of product understanding. The two are related in that the more people use a new technology the more awareness there is of it and a positive adoption cycle continues until it’s mainstream.

    Because so few people have used our type of technology, we spend thousands of dollars per customer making sure they’re successful and manually helping them out. 5-7 years from now enough people will have used our type of technology such that a lower cost entrant in our market will be successful by offering a simpler interface with only the most important features and they’ll be able to sign up companies that already have experience, and thus don’t need a comprehensive on-boarding experience.

    Free or open source works for an educated market. When the market isn’t ready, these types of distribution models don’t work as well as traditional models.

    What else? What are your thoughts on free or open source products in a market that isn’t ready?

  • Premature Scaling Worries in a Startup

    Recently I was talking to an entrepreneur about his startup. After about 10 minutes into his idea, I stopped him and said that he was having premature scaling and delivery worries. 95% of startups fail due to a lack of a sales and 5% fail due to a lack of being able to deliver what’s been sold (made up numbers but the idea is still true).

    Here are some common premature scaling questions to look our for as an entrepreneur:

    • Should I choose Zendesk or Help.com for my support software? Have you sold anything yet? Go sell something first and use plain email until you’re overwhelmed with support inquires.
    • Where will I find good operations people? Have you sold anything yet? Good people are readily available once you have revenue.
    • How much money should we raise for this idea? Have you sold anything yet? Investors are unlikely to invest in the idea until the startup has some paying customers.

    The next time you hear premature scaling worries, focus the conversation on building a repeatable customer acquisition process and defer the scaling conversation until it becomes a high class problem that’s on the near-term horizon.

    What else? What are some other premature scaling worries in a startup?

  • Notes from salesforce.com, inc. 2003 S-1 IPO Filing

    The largest and most successful SaaS/cloud company, salesforce.com, inc. (yes, that’s the proper spelling of the company), filed their S-1 for an IPO on December 18, 2003. With the annual Dreamforce conference next week, and the fact that their market cap is now $21.5 billion (NASDAQ: CRM), a little trip down memory lane to see how things were nine years ago is on tap.

    Here are notes from the salesforce.com, inc. 2003 S-1 IPO filing:

    • Signed 8,000 paying subscribers from February 2000 to October 2003 and 110,000 seats (pg. 1) – SFDC now has over 110,000 paying subscribers and many millions of seats
    • May 2003 IDC reports project SaaS/cloud-based apps to be $2.6 billion in 2007 (pg. 1) – SFDC alone is going to be larger than $2.6 billion in revenue in 2013
    • Incorporated in Delaware in February 1999 and released first product in February 2000 (pg. 2)
    • Revenues (pg. 4)
      2001 – $5.4 million
      2002 – $22.2 million
      2003 – $50.9 million
      Nine months ended Oct 31, 2003 – $65.9 million
    • Losses (pg. 4)
      2001 – $33.6 million
      2002 – $30.1 million
      2003 – $9.3 million
    • Accumulated deficit – $71 million (pg. 4)
    • Small business customers have shorter contracts and higher rate of attrition (pg. 9)
    • Fiscal 2003 sales to Europe and Asia accounted for 14 and 17 percent of revenue, respectively (pg. 11)
    • Database software comes from Oracle Corporation (pg. 13)
    • Research and development expenses (pg. 23)
      2001  – $3.3 million
      2002 – $5.3 million
      2003 – $4.6 million
    • In December 2001 abandoned excess office space and took a $7.7 million charge (pg. 26)
    • Owned 64% of a Japanese joint venture (pg. 27)
    • Raised $61.1 million from investors in exchange for preferred stock (pg. 38)
    • $3.5 million letter of credit for office rent in 2001 (pg. 39)
    • 2004 office lease expense of $5.4 million (pg. 39)
    • 10,000 free Personal Edition users activated (pg. 47)
    • Application is written in Java and Oracle PL/SQL (pg. 48)
    • A small number of customers have service level agreements (pg. 50)
    • Field sales offices in more than 20 cities (pg. 51)
    • 412 employees as of Oct 31, 2003 (pg. 53)
    • Equity owned before IPO (pg. 72)
      Marc Benioff – 31.6%
      Halsey Minor – 10.2%
      Parker Harris – 2.7%
      Attractor Funds – 6.0%

    Similar to the Workday IPO filing in the summer of 2012, this salesforce.com IPO filing from 2003 is highly unusual in that it’s a SaaS/cloud company that raised an impressive amount of capital and reached IPO-level recurring revenue in a short amount of time. Salesforce.com sets the standard for SaaS/cloud software companies and shows no signs of slowing down.

    What else? What are some other thoughts on the salesforce.com 2003 S-1 IPO filing?